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GUANTÁNAMO, HABEAS CORPUS, AND STANDARDS OF PROOF:
VIEWING THE LAW THROUGH MULTIPLE LENSES
Matthew C. Waxman*
The Supreme Court held in Boumediene v. Bush that Guantánamo detainees 
have a constitutional right to habeas corpus review of their detention, but it 
left to district courts in the first instance responsibility for working through 
the appropriate standard of proof and related evidentiary principles im-
posed on the government to justify continued detention. This article argues 
that embedded in seemingly straightforward judicial standard-setting with 
respect to proof and evidence are significant policy questions about compet-
ing risks and their distribution. How one approaches these questions de-
pends on the lens through which one views the problem: through that of a 
courtroom concerned with evidence or through that of a battlefield clouded 
by imperfect intelligence. All three branches of government should play 
significant roles in answering these questions, which are critical to estab-
lishing sound detention policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court held in Boumediene v. Bush that Guantánamo 
detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus review of their deten-
tion.1 However, the Court left to district courts in the first instance responsi-
bility for working through the many procedural and substantive issues that 
would govern resulting habeas proceedings.2 While mandating that Guantá-
namo detainees receive access to U.S. federal courts empowered to correct 
errors after “meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the Ex-
ecutive’s power to detain,”3
* Associate Professor, Columbia Law School; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign 
Relations; Member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. I 
thank the following individuals for their helpful comments and guidance: Robert Chesney, 
Philip Hamburger, Dan Richman, and Benjamin Wittes. I also thank Neta Levanon for her 
excellent research assistance.
the Court emphasized that it was “not ad-
1 See 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
2 See Del Quentin Wilber, Detention Challenges Are Far Off for Many, WASH. POST, July 
31, 2009, at A06, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
07/30/AR2009073004116.html. See also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1163 (2009) (“To say that the 
Suspension clause affirmatively guarantees a right to habeas corpus leaves open a welter of 
issues about the scope of that right.”).
3 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008).
246 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:245
dress[ing] the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention.”4
In a 2008 article I compared detention decision-making to military 
targeting decision-making and argued that international law rules governing 
targeting could be imported by analogy to help derive answers to the ques-
tion: If a state is engaged in armed conflict with a transnational terrorist 
organization, and the state decides to detain or continue detaining someone 
fighting on the enemy’s behalf, how certain ought the state have to be in its 
assessment of that individual’s identity and enemy status?
The 
particular questions I focus on here—questions with procedural and subs-
tantive, domestic and international law dimensions—concern the standard 
of proof and related evidentiary principles imposed by habeas courts on the 
government to justify continued detention.
5
This article argues that embedded in seemingly straightforward 
judicial standard-setting with respect to proof and evidence are significant 
policy questions about competing risks and their distribution. How one ap-
proaches these questions depends on the lens through which one views the 
problem: through that of a courtroom concerned with evidence or through 
that of a battlefield clouded by imperfect intelligence. The article concludes 
that all three branches of government should play significant roles in work-
ing through these questions, which are critical to establishing sound policy 
not only for those currently detained at Guantánamo, but also for those like-
ly to be captured in the future struggle against al-Qaida.
This Article 
examines how district courts have so far dealt with this issue.
II. STANDARD OF PROOF ISSUES
One question that quickly arises in habeas proceedings reviewing 
enemy combatant detentions is the appropriate standard of proof: to what 
level of certainty must the government prove the factual bases of its deten-
tion decision? For all enemy combatant detentions until Hamdi v. Rumsfeld6
and Boumediene,7
4 Id. at 2277.
and since then for detentions of al-Qaida and allied figh-
ters pursuant to war powers outside the U.S. or Guantánamo, the executive 
has dealt with this issue unilaterally and internally—i.e., through its own 
judgments of legally necessary factual certainty about a suspect’s identity 
and conduct to warrant and authorize detention. Once habeas rights or some 
other form of judicial review apply, however, courts must quickly confront 
this issue more formally and explicitly. The courts’ assessments of the gov-
ernment’s claims about particular suspects must be measured against some 
5 See Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Deten-
tion of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008).
6 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
7 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
2009] GUANTÁNAMO, HABEAS, AND PROOF STANDARDS 247
standard, whether it be a low one such as the “some evidence” standard or a 
high one like “clear and convincing” or “beyond reasonable doubt.”8
At the time of this writing, all district courts to consider Guantána-
mo habeas cases have reached or adopted the same answer: that courts 
should apply the “preponderance of evidence” standard—i.e., more proba-
ble than not—in assessing whether an individual is properly detained under 
the executive’s detention power,9 however that power is defined.10 There 
was initially some dispute over this issue in the many consolidated cases 
before Judge Hogan.11 Detainees’ counsel urged the court to use a “clear 
and convincing” standard,12 the standard the Supreme Court has held to 
apply in some other contexts where the government seeks to impose sub-
stantial deprivation of liberty.13 The government urged instead that it ought 
only have to put forth credible evidence that the petitioner meets the proper 
detention criteria, after which the burden should shift to petitioner to rebut it 
with more persuasive evidence.14
8 The “beyond reasonable doubt” standard for criminal conviction, held to be constitu-
tionally required in In re Wiship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), reflects one possible balance of com-
peting harms with respect to criminal suspects.  As Blackstone explained, “it is better that ten 
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *358 (1853). The question here is to what extent the threat of terrorism re-
quires recalibrating that balance.
Ultimately, the government urged a pre-
ponderance of evidence standard, distinguishing the cases cited by petition-
9 See, e.g., Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2009); Bihani v. Ob-
ama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2009); Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49 (D.D.C. 
2008); El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 146 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. 
Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2008); Hammamy v. Obama, 604 F. Supp. 2d 240, 242 (D.D.C. 
2009); Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d. 30, 35 n.12 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Ginco v. Obama, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53932, at 6–7 (D.D.C. 2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 
191, 195–96 (D.D.C. 2008); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Al Mutairi 
v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2364173, at *1 (D.D.C. July 29, 
2009).
10 On the difficult legal and policy issues of defining detention authority in the context of 
terrorism, see generally Matthew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why 
Detain, and Detain Whom? 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1 (2009).
11 See Petitioner’s Joint Memorandum of Law Addressing Procedural Framework Issues at 
11–13, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. July 25, 
2008), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-dcdce/case_no-1:2008mc00442/
case_id-131990/ [hereinafter Procedural Framework Memorandum].
12 Id. at 11–13.
13 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (discussing the civil commit-
ment of sex offenders); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992) (discussing the contin-
ued commitment of criminal suspects found not guilty by reason of insanity); United States 
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (discussing pre-trial detention based on alleged 
dangerousness).
14 See Procedural Framework Memorandum, supra note 11, at 15.
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ers as irrelevant in the wartime context.15 The district court sided with the 
government,16 and since then other district court judges have uniformly—
and without analysis—applied the same standard in Guantánamo habeas 
cases. Courts probably gravitated toward the preponderance standard for 
these cases in part because preponderance of evidence is typically the stan-
dard presumptively applied in most habeas contexts.17
Should preponderance of evidence be the proof standard in these 
cases? The dearth of judicial analysis of this question at any level is surpris-
ing given how often the outcome of these cases will centrally turn on this 
question.18 After all, the fundamental problem out of which these cases 
grow is a conflict against a transnational terrorist organization that does not
openly mark its members and supporters as such, but instead tries to obfus-
cate their identity.19 Almost every seriously contested case will involve a 
dispute about the strength of the government’s information supporting its 
assessment. And in those cases for which habeas review will make a mea-
ningful difference between release or continued detention, the government’s 
case will likely include judgments made in the murky fog of war, reliance 
on intelligence supplied by foreign governments, or assessments developed 
based on patterns of suspects’ behavior in relation to what is known about 
the enemy.20
15 See Government’s Response to Petitioner’s Filing on Framework Procedural Issues at 
8–11, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 
2008), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-dcdce/case_no-1:2008mc00442/
case_id-131990/.
16 See Case Management Order at 4, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. 
No. 08-0442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/
court-dcdce/case_no-1:2008mc00442/case_id-131990/.
17 See 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 1497 (2001) (explaining that because habeas proceedings are generally consi-
dered civil in nature, the presumptive standard of proof is preponderance of evidence).
18 For a thorough scholarly examination of this issue from the perspective of domestic 
habeas law, concluding that preponderance standard is an acceptable approach in this con-
text, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive 
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV 2032, 2092–93 (2007).
19 The Israeli Supreme Court recently made this point in upholding Israel’s Internment of 
Unlawful Combatants Law. See CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel [2008], at 20 
(Isr.), translation available at http://elyon2.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.
n04.pdf (“[U]nlawful combatants do not as a rule carry any clear and unambiguous indica-
tion that they belong to a terrorist organization.” (citation omitted)).
20 Many of the cases considered by Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantánamo 
involved plausible denials or silence on the detainee pitted against plausible inferences drawn 
from intelligence sources.  See BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF 
JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR 72–99 (2008). See also Al Odah v. United States,  Civil Ac-
tion No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2730489, at *15 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009) (stating that “the 
Court finds that the Government has met its burden based on the evidence in the record with-
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Consider, for example, two cases that appear to fall close to but ul-
timately settle on different sides of the preponderance line. In Al Mutairi v. 
United States, the district court implied that the government narrowly failed 
to justify detention of a Kuwaiti national alleged to have joined al-Qaida 
and an affiliated terrorist group. Although the government established that 
the petitioner’s activities and travel closely matched patterns of al-Qaida 
agents, the court went on to find that:
[T]he Government has at best shown that some of Al Mutairi’s conduct 
was consistent with persons who may have become a part of al Qaida or an 
associated force of al Qaida, but there is nothing in the record beyond 
speculation that Al Mutairi did, in fact, train with or otherwise become a 
part of either or both of those organizations. While Al Mutairi’s described 
travels within Afghanistan lack credibility, the Government has not sup-
planted Al Mutairi’s version of his travels with sufficiently credible and 
reliable evidence to meet its burden of persuasion by a preponderance of 
the evidence.21
In Boumediene v. Bush, on remand, the district court ordered the 
government to release five of six native Algerians taken by the U.S. gov-
ernment in Bosnia.22
[T]he Government has met its burden by providing additional evidence 
that sufficiently corroborates its allegations from [an] unnamed source that 
Bensayah is an al-Qaida facilitator. . . . In order to establish Bensayah’s 
role as an al-Qaida facilitator, the Government depends on the same intel-
ligence information described above [and found to be unpersuasive with 
respect to the other five], but also puts forth a series of other intelligence 
reports based on a variety of sources and evidence . . . .
As to the sixth, however, the court held that:
23
Not only do this sixth case in Boumediene and Al Mutairi appear to 
fall close to the preponderance line, but the courts’ descriptions also high-
light how easily different judges viewing the same evidence could reach 
different conclusions, either because they weigh certain pieces of evidence 
differently or because they view the standard differently.24
out specifically identifying that the Taliban-run camp attended by Al Odah was, in fact, Al
Farouq. ”).    
It is easy to 
21 Al Mutairi v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2364173, at *1 
(D.D.C. July 29, 2009).
22 Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197–98 (D.D.C. 2008).
23 Id. at 198.
24 See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or 
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293 (1982) (documenting ambiguity and 
different interpretations of proof burdens among judges).  For another example in the Guan-
tánamo context, consider Awad v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-CV-2379 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 
2009), available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv2379-178.  
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wonder after reading these two decisions in full whether any principled line 
drawing distinguishes them. 
One way of looking at the standard of proof question is through the 
lens of domestic law. Viewing the issue as one of procedural due process 
and applying the Mathews v. Eldridge25 balancing test, the Supreme Court 
in Hamdi made clear with respect to citizen-detainees that risk of erroneous 
detention is the key individual interest to be protected.26 The Mathews ba-
lancing test assesses the sufficiency of procedural protections based on the 
importance of the individual interest at stake, the state’s interests, the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of the individual’s interests, and the probable val-
ue of additional procedural safeguards.27 So considering these factors in the 
context of detaining al-Qaida suspects, how much risk of error is appropri-
ate? Neither Hamdi—which, in the case of a citizen-detainee, called for a 
“fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neu-
tral decisionmaker”28—nor the Supreme Court’s extension of Hamdi’s prin-
ciples in Boumediene—requiring a “meaningful opportunity to demonstrate 
that [a detainee] is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or in-
terpretation’ of relevant law”29—answer that question. True, Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi rejects both the government’s sug-
gestion that it need only show a court “some evidence” to back up its deci-
sions—the lowest proof standard used by courts—as well as the Petitioner’s 
suggestion that criminal trial standards are required.30 But that still leaves a 
lot of room in between.31
In that case, Judge Robertson acknowledged that “the case against Awad is gossamer thin.”  
Id. at slip op. 20. He goes on to say that “[t]he evidence is of a kind fit only for these unique 
proceedings [REDACTED]” but in the end, it seems “more likely than not that Awad was, 
for some period of time, ‘part of’ al Qaida” and the correlation of names on the list “clearly 
tied to al Qaida make it more likely than not that he knew the al Qaida fighters at the hospital 
and joined them in the barricade.”  Id. at slip op. 20–21.
25 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
26 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532–33 (2003).
27 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
28 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. See also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 18, at 2091 (“Although 
we . . . approve of the plurality’s basic approach in Hamdi, its opinion is regrettably unclear 
on crucial points, including the burden of persuasion that the government must meet to 
justify detaining an American citizen as an enemy combatant.”).  
29 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2238 (2008) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
289, 302 (2001)).
30 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537–39.  Justice O’Connor may have hinted also at the appro-
priateness of the preponderance standard when she said that “once the Government puts forth 
credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus 
could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls 
outside the criteria.”  Id. at 534.
31 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2271 (“[t]he extent of the showing required of the gov-
ernment in these cases is a matter to be determined.”); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas 
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One of the most interesting applications of the minimal Hamdi
guidance as to the standard of proof issue appears in the district court’s con-
sideration of Boumediene v. Bush on remand.32
[W]hile the information in the classified intelligence report, relating to the 
credibility and reliability of the source, was undoubtedly sufficient for the 
intelligence purposes for which it was prepared, it is not sufficient for the 
purposes for which a habeas court must now evaluate it. To allow enemy 
combatancy to rest on so thin a reed would be inconsistent with this 
Court’s obligation under the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi to protect 
petitioners from the risk of erroneous detention.
In rejecting the govern-
ment’s claims that petitioner fell within the executive’s detention authority, 
the court explained:
33
It is not so clear, however, how thick or thin a reed Hamdi requires. 
Procedural due process doctrine is not about preventing all errors, but rather 
reducing their likelihood to a legally appropriate probability. Standing 
alone, the holdings of Hamdi and Boumediene offer little guidance on what 
level of error is appropriate. This lack of guidance exists because setting 
that standard depends critically on a balance of risks and a notion of how 
these risks should be shared or distributed, issues that so far courts have 
been cautious to tackle.34
Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of these 
two types of erroneous outcomes [false positives and false negatives], the 
choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation 
should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social 
disutility of each.
As Justice Harlan explained in In re Winship:
35
Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo: The Boumediene Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 58 
(2008) (“Habeas courts will face a complex of questions falling under the general heading of 
‘scope of review’” including “the deference (if any) that they should give to various determi-
nations by CSRTs . . . .”).
32 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008).
33 Id. at 197 (emphasis in original).
34 The Fourth Circuit struggled with this issue in Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 
274 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008), vacated by,
remanded by, application granted by Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (Traxler, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (“In the words of Matthews, [the proposed proof standards 
and burdens] would sufficiently address the ‘risk of an erroneous deprivation’ of a detainee’s
liberty interest while eliminating certain procedures that have question additional value in 
light of the burden on the [g]overnment.”) (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 
(2003)).
35 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Dale A. Nance, Evidential 
Completeness and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 622 (1998) (“The now con-
ventional understanding of the burden of proof is that the level or weight of the burden of 
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As alluded to earlier,36 in other contexts involving substantial de-
privation of liberty, courts have required the government to justify its case 
by clear and convincing evidence. In Addington v. Texas, for example, the 
Supreme Court held that the clear and convincing standard is constitutional-
ly required in civil commitment hearings.37 In doing so the Court explained 
that “[t]he standard [of proof] serves to allocate the risk of error between the 
litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate de-
cision.”38 In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court upheld pretrial 
detention under the federal Bail Reform Act relying heavily on its view that 
the Act’s requirement of “clear and convincing evidence that no conditions 
of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person” 
struck an appropriate balance liberty-security balance.39
In the Guantánamo context, however, setting proof standards is es-
pecially difficult because the factors to be balanced are so weighty in mul-
tiple directions—they include, among many other considerations, the harm 
of erroneous detention under severe conditions, perhaps indefinitely, versus 
the risk of letting a dangerous terrorist go free.40
persuasion is determined by the expected utilities associated with correct and incorrect alter-
native decisions.”).
Both of these are arguably 
36 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
37 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
38 Id. at 423.
39 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). See also Foucha v. Louisiana, 
504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992) (explaining that the clear and convincing standard applicable in Sa-
lerno was critical to that holding).
40 Judge Posner poses this question but does not provide a specific answer:
Requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases causes many guilty 
defendants to be acquitted and many other guilty persons not to be charged in the 
first place.  We accept this as a price worth paying to protect the innocent.  But or-
dinary crime does not imperil national security; modern terrorism does, so the gov-
ernment’s burden of proof should be lighter, though how much lighter is a matter 
of judgment.
RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY 64–65 (2006).  This point arose in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), in 
which the Court made clear that indefinite administrative detention of a removable alien 
would raise constitutional due process concerns, but also noted that a statutory scheme di-
rected at suspected terrorists might change its analysis in light of heightened security stakes.  
See id. at 691.
It is important to note, however, that the threat level among detainees at Guantánamo and 
elsewhere varies significantly, and there is considerable debate about “recidivism” rates 
among those released from Guantánamo.  Compare U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FACT 
SHEET, FORMER GUANTANAMO DETAINEE TERRORISM TRENDS (Apr. 7, 2009), available at
www.defenselink.mil/news/returntothefightfactsheet2.pdf (reporting fourteen percent of 
former Guantánamo detainees likely reengaged in terrorist activities) (last visited Oct. 31, 
2009), with Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Commentary: How Many Gitmo Prison-
ers Return to Fight?, CNN, July 21, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/20/
2009] GUANTÁNAMO, HABEAS, AND PROOF STANDARDS 253
greater dangers than those considered in most civil or criminal detention 
contexts.41
Viewed through the lens of the international law of war the same 
questions arise but by a different analytic route. The Obama administration 
has taken the position in ongoing habeas litigation that its detention authori-
ty pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force should 
be interpreted by reference to the international law of armed conflict,
And for that matter, how one views the liberty harms depends on 
whether one begins from a baseline of peacetime, where individual liberty is 
the strongly protected interest, or wartime, where liberty deprivations are 
more widely shared and procedural protections are often curtailed, or some 
baseline in between. 
42 and 
courts have generally agreed with that approach. If courts are looking to 
international law to discern the substantive bounds of executive detention 
power in this context, should they not also look to those same sources of 
law to discern the standard of proof?43
On the face of their opinions, the habeas courts are not looking to 
the law of war for guidance on the proof standard issue, likely seeing it as a 
procedural question rather than a substantive one. Even if courts did, how-
ever, the law of war does not provide clear guidance.
If habeas is an error correction me-
chanism, and the Supreme Court made clear in Boumediene that habeas is a 
flexible tool to be adapted to particular contexts, then its standards should 
be informed by the substantive law whose bounds it is policing.
International law of detention in warfare contains little definitive 
guidance on the standard of proof or certainty issue probably for two over-
arching reasons. First, in the limited-duration, conventional warfare between 
professional armies out of which the modern law developed, the issue of 
detention review standards rarely needed such precise guidance. Second, the 
appropriate standard of proof or certainty in warfare is very context-
dependent.44
bergen.guantanamo/index.html (disputing Defense Department figures) (last visited on Oct. 
31, 2009).
Article 5 of the the Third Geneva Convention, for example, 
requires that:
41 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91, 696 (2001) (stating that due process 
analysis with respect to immigration detention might be different if it involved suspected 
terrorists or special national security needs).
42 See, e.g., Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority 
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 
Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf .
43 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas 
corpus has served as a means of revieing the legality of Executive detention . . . .”).  On the 
law of war and detention authorities, see generally Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civi-
lians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 48 (2009).
44 See Waxman, supra note 5, at 1379–84.
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Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a bellige-
rent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of 
[the combatant categories established by the Geneva Conventions], such 
persons shall enjoy the protections of the present Convention until such 
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.45
But Article 5 says nothing about what level of certainty a “competent tri-
bunal” should apply in resolving any doubt.46
Longstanding U.S. military regulations based on Article 5 of the 
Third Geneva Convention call for battlefield review of questionable deten-
tions by a panel of officers applying a preponderance of evidence stan-
dard,47 and in her plurality opinion in Hamdi, Justice O’Connor pointed 
favorably toward these standards as a model that might satisfy due 
process.48 But it is not clear from these military regulations whether the 
U.S. military regards the preponderance standard as legally compelled or 
prudentially warranted, nor whether it would regard a higher standard as 
legally appropriate in some contexts. Looking abroad, there is very little 
clear state practice on this question from which to measure opinio juris.49
As an alternative approach to filling this gap, I previously argued 
that the principles of targeting law in warfare could be extrapolated to pro-
vide guidance on the standard of proof or certainty issue with respect to 
non-criminal terrorist detention. The “reasonable care” requirement with 
respect to verifying the targets of lethal force amid factual uncertainty could 
be adapted to the detention context. I argued, based on general law of war 
principles, that the appropriate standard of certainty required to justify de-
tention at any point in time depended on a balance between military necessi-
ty or security concerns and humanitarian or liberty interests, and should take 
45 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (1950).
46 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has developed recommended 
procedural guidelines that should apply in such cases. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED 
CONFLICTS at Annex 1 (2007), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/
html/ihl-30-international-conference-101207. See also Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles 
and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situa-
tions of Violence, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375 (2005).
47 See U.S. ARMY, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES 
AND OTHER DETAINEES, AR 190-8, at § 1-6(9) (1997), available at http://www.au.af.mil/
au/awc/awcgate/law/ar190-8.pdf (“Following the hearing of testimony and the review of 
documents and other evidence, the Tribunal shall determine the status of the subject of the 
proceeding in closed session by majority vote. Preponderance of evidence shall be the stan-
dard used in reaching this determination.”).
48 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538–39 (2004).
49 See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal 
and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1089 (2008).
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into account whether greater accuracy-producing procedures are reasonably 
available.50
Note, however, that viewing the problem of proof or certainty 
through the lens of warfare takes the legal question of appropriate assess-
ment standards back to the same questions about competing values and pol-
icy interests demanded by Mathews v. Eldridge:51 What are the individual 
interests at stake with respect to errors? What are the state interests at stake? 
And what steps could the government take—and at what cost or burden—to 
reduce errors?52 This is not to suggest that the preponderance standard being 
used by habeas courts is wrong—in fact, when the Department of Defense 
established Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantánamo in the wake 
of Hamdi and Rasul v. Bush, 53 its applicable guidelines also called for using 
the preponderance standard,54
Moreover, the balancing of these competing risks through proce-
dural regulation cannot be divorced completely from important substantive 
legal issues, such as the scope of the executive’s detention power. As John 
Jeffries and Paul Stephan have observed in the criminal law context:
implying that the executive regards the pre-
ponderance standard as the appropriate standard as well. Rather, this analy-
sis suggests the need for more reasoned consideration of proof standards in 
this context given the unique problems, stakes, and risks associated with 
decision-making.
Winship’s insistence on the reasonable-doubt standard is thought to ex-
press a preference for letting the guilty go free rather than risking convic-
tion of the innocent. This value choice, however, cannot be implemented 
by a purely procedural concern with burden of proof. . . . A normative 
principle for protecting the “innocent” must take into account not only the 
certainty with which facts are established but also the selection of facts to 
be proved. A constitutional policy to minimize the risk of convicting the 
“innocent” must be grounded in a constitutional conception of what may 
constitute “guilt.” Otherwise “guilt” would have to be proved with certain-
50 See Waxman, supra note 5, at 1402–20.
51 494 U.S. 319, 335 (1979).
52 See supra notes 25–27. 
53 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
54 See Memorandum of Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy at 
3 (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.
pdf. Deputy Secretary of the Navy Gordon England explained the standard a bit differently in 
announcing the establishment of the CSRT process: “[W]e’ll look at all the data dealing with 
their classification as an enemy combatant; . . . [a]nd the standard . . . will be reasonableness. 
It will be what would a reasonable person conclude.” See Gordon England, Sec’y of the 
Navy, Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) (July 9, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2777.
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ty, but the legislature could define “guilt” as it pleased, and the grand ideal 
of individual liberty would be reduced to an empty promise.55
In other words, the extent to which a proof standard prevents “errors” de-
pends in part on how the factual predicate to be proven is defined—in this 
case, what does it mean to be an enemy fighter subject to the executive’s 
wartime detention authority? A very broadly defined substantive authority 
even coupled with a strict proof standard may be no better at accurately 
culling true threats than a tightly drawn authority coupled with a loose proof 
standard. Thinking through the standard of proof question carefully can 
therefore help both to devise substantive detention law and prevent its cir-
cumvention.
III. EVIDENTIARY SCRUTINY ISSUES
The standard of proof issue is, of course, linked inextricably to 
questions about quality of evidence: on what types of information should a 
court base its assessment in reviewing executive detention? It is not the in-
tention of this article to delve deeply into the many specific evidence law 
issues that are likely to arise in Guantánamo habeas cases, but rather to 
draw observations about the way courts have approached the issue general-
ly. Again, sufficiency or quality of evidence issues can be viewed through 
multiple lenses: evidence versus intelligence, and courtroom versus battle-
field. And again, lurking beneath these seemingly routine court rulings 
about evidence standards are major substantive and institutional questions 
about the nature of the conflict with al-Qaida and courts’ proper role in 
regulating it. 
The executive originally took the position in detainee litigation that 
the designation of an individual as an enemy fighter is a judgment that 
courts should not second-guess. In its brief to the Supreme Court in Hamdi,
the government argued that “[a] commander’s wartime determination that 
an individual is an enemy combatant is a quintessentially military judgment, 
representing a core exercise of the Commander-in-Chief authority.”56 It 
argued from a functional standpoint that courts should not second-guess 
assessments of disputed facts because, “[e]specially in the course of hostili-
ties, the military through its operations and intelligence-gathering has an 
unmatched vantage point from which to learn about the enemy and make 
judgments as to whether those seized during a conflict are friend or foe.”57
55 John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of 
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1347 (1979).
And from a constitutional separation of powers standpoint, the government 
56 Brief for the Respondents, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 724020, at *25.
57 Id.
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argued that courts should avoid “embroiling [themselves] in a factual dis-
pute about a battlefield capture halfway around the world.”58 Anticipating 
the response that many detainees at Guantánamo were not captured amid 
battle in a combat zone, the government further argued that “[t]he uncon-
ventional nature of the current armed conflict only makes such deference 
more appropriate” because “[t]he enemy in the current conflict purposely 
blurs the lines between combatants and non-combatants by refusing to wear 
a uniform or distinctive insignia and attempting to blend into the civilian 
population.”59 The government made similar arguments in its Supreme 
Court brief in Rasul v. Bush: “The ‘enemy’ status of aliens captured and 
detained during war is a quintessential political question on which the courts 
respect the actions of the political branches.”60 The government further ar-
gued that “courts have . . . no judicially-manageable standards[] to evaluate 
or second-guess the conduct of the President and the military” on such 
matters.61
The Supreme Court flatly rejected the executive’s argument that as-
sessments of who is or is not an enemy fighter in an ongoing war lie outside 
the sphere of judicial competence and authority. In her plurality opinion in 
Hamdi, Justice O’Connor emphasizes: “In so holding, we necessarily reject 
the Government’s assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a 
heavily circumscribed role for courts in such circumstances,” and that 
“courts must forgo any examination of the individual case.”62
Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say, after being 
tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most press-
ing. . . . Habeas corpus proceedings need not resemble a criminal trial . . . . 
But the writ must be effective. The habeas court must have sufficient au-
thority to conduct a meaningful review of both the cause for detention and 
the Executive’s power to detain.
In Boume-
diene, the Court further explained that:
63
The Court went on to say that:
For the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute, to function as an effective 
and proper remedy in this context, the court that conducts the habeas pro-
ceeding must have the means to correct errors that occurred during the 
[Combatant Status Review Tribunal] proceedings. This includes some au-
58 Id. at *27.
59 Id. at *31.
60 Brief for the Respondents, Rasul v. Bush, 2004 WL 425739, at *35.
61 Id. at *37 n.19.
62 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–36 (2004).
63 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008).
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thority to assess the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence against the 
detainee.64
What these Supreme Court holdings do not explain, however, is 
how habeas courts should assess the sufficiency of information relied upon 
by the executive in its decisions. Boumediene calls for “meaningful” review 
of the executive’s assessment and for “some” authority to consider the suf-
ficiency of the government’s information. But Boumediene provides very 
little guidance as to the rigor with which courts should independently scru-
tinize that information or the specific rules and standards by which informa-
tion should be considered or rejected.65
Against that backdrop, some district courts have adopted fairly ag-
gressive interpretations of their evidentiary gatekeeping role—i.e., what 
kind of information comes in during hearings—and of their fact-finding role 
in appraising it.66 Recall from above, for example, the district court’s state-
ment in Boumediene that “the information in the classified intelligence re-
port, relating to the credibility and reliability of the source, was undoubtedly 
sufficient for the intelligence purposes for which it was prepared”—but that 
it was not adequate to satisfy the government’s burden in court.67 In Ali
Ahmed v. Obama, the government sought to rely on a “mosaic theory” to 
prove petitioner’s conduct in support of al-Qaida: “The Government argues 
. . . that ‘the evidence meshes together to demonstrate’ that the Petitioner 
engaged in conduct that allows the executive to detain him.”68
The Court understands from the Government’s declarations, and from case 
law, that use of the mosaic approach is a common and well-established 
mode of analysis in the intelligence community. This may well be true. 
Nonetheless, at this point in this long, drawn-out litigation the Court’s ob-
ligation is to make findings of fact and conclusions of law which satisfy 
appropriate and relevant legal standards as to whether the Government has 
In rejecting 
its application to the case at hand, however, the court explained:
64 Id. at 2270.
65 Nor, for that matter, does it answer such basic questions as whether the court should 
review whether the executive had sufficient basis to detain at some previous time versus 
whether it has such evidence at the time of review.
66 See Al Mutairi v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2364173, at 
*3 (D.D.C. July 29, 2009) (“One of the central functions of the Court in this case is ‘to eva-
luate the raw evidence’ proffered by the Government and to determine whether it is ‘suffi-
ciently reliable and sufficiently probative to demonstrate the truth of the asserted proposition 
with the requisite degree of clarity.’”)(internal citations omitted) See also Parhat v. Gates, 
532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding inadequate the Government’s evidentiary basis for 
CSRT decisions).
67 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
68 Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55–56 (D.D.C. 2009).
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proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner is justifiably 
detained.69
The district court went on to state: “The kind and amount of evidence which 
satisfies the intelligence community in reaching final conclusions about the 
value of information it obtains may be very different, and certainly cannot 
govern the Court’s ruling.”70
It is difficult to generalize much from these few district court snip-
pets in part because they can be read in several ways. Are the courts saying 
that the specific evidentiary submissions by the government in those partic-
ular cases were, once scrutinized in court, shown to be too unreliable? Or 
are they saying that the types of information relied on by the government to 
form its assessments of who is or is not an enemy fighter are unsuitable 
generally as proof in court reviews of detention? And if the latter, are the 
courts saying that, while recognizing the legal appropriateness of reliance 
on intelligence information to support detention in far away combat zones, 
they are unwilling to give a judicial imprimatur to similar reliance once a 
case reaches a courtroom? Or, going much further, are they saying that the 
law of war—even outside the reach of courts—demands the type and quali-
ty of evidence that would satisfy a court? The courts’ posture with respect to 
evidentiary sufficiency lies ambiguously amid this spectrum.
Moreover, these statements by habeas courts rejecting the sufficien-
cy of some government submissions raise important distinctions between 
“evidence” and “intelligence.” Seen through the lens of the courtroom, a 
natural analytic starting point for assessing an individual’s enemy status is 
evidence, or facts that are “furnished to a legal tribunal otherwise than by 
reasoning . . . .”71
69 Id. at 56 (footnote omitted).
Seen, however, through the lens of a global “battlefield,”
a natural starting point is intelligence—informational assessments and edu-
70 Id. See also Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009) (“The 
kind and amount of evidence which satisfies the intelligence community in reaching final 
conclusions about the value of information it obtains may be very different from, and certain-
ly cannot determine, this Court’s ruling.”).
71 See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §1, at 11 (1983); 
see also Bostan v. Obama, No. 05-883, slip op. at 10 n.5 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2009), available 
at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv2386-1408 (applying Feder-
al Rules of Evidence to Guantánamo habeas cases, “except where national security concerns 
or undue burden to the government requires otherwise.”). See also id. at 6–7 (“The very 
notion that the Court should lower its standards of admissibility to whatever level the gov-
ernment is prepared (or even able) to satisfy is contradictory to the fundamental principles of 
fairness that inform the Great Writ’s existence.”).
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cated judgments that the executive relies on in making tactical and opera-
tional decisions.72
Evidence assessment and intelligence assessment are similar but not 
identical processes, in part because their purposes differ. Both seek truth, 
though in the case of evidence in the American justice system it is taken as 
an article of faith that adversarial contestation will generally enhance it,73
whereas intelligence collection and assessment is often a unilateral endeavor 
relying on interpretation and reasoned assessment amid uncertainties to 
guide government actions, and is often conducted and recorded with little 
regard for eventual courtroom use.74 Moreover, the law of evidence serves 
not only to promote accuracy but also to protect justice and fairness;75 intel-
ligence, by contrast, is generally unconcerned with balancing competing 
values.76
Lest one think these are merely semantic or inconsequential distinc-
tions, consider that beyond Guantánamo it is sometimes those same “intelli-
gence purposes” viewed skeptically by the courts upon which the executive 
relies in making decisions of enormous military and humanitarian or liberty 
consequences. These include detention decisions in Afghanistan, where 
recently revised Department of Defense guidelines establish military review 
panels applying a preponderance of evidence standard to all reasonably 
72 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF 
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 208 (2001 as amended through Aug. 2009); CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO INTELLIGENCE at vii (1999).
73 See Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form and Function:  The Search for Truth and 
the Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Justice Systems, 12 INT’L LEGAL 
PERSP. 185, 188–89. See also Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L.REV
1267, 1283 (citing Wigmore and stating that cross-examination “is beyond any doubt the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”).
74 See Wilber, supra note 2 (reporting controversy over whether government’s Guantána-
mo habeas cases are flimsy or involve evidence “collected on chaotic battlefields for intelli-
gence purposes, not for a courtroom.”). As the Wall Street Journal editorial page put it, 
“[T]he truth is that in the fog of battle it is impossible to gather evidence the way a Manhat-
tan cop can. There’s no ‘CSI: Kandahar.’”  Editorial, The Enemy Detainee Mess, WALL ST.
J., July 3, 2008, at A10.
75 See FED. R. EVID. 102 (stating “These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in ad-
ministration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and 
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceed-
ings justly determined.”).
76 This paper does not deal with the many complex issues surrounding classified evidence 
in detention hearings, and the special problems that come with trying to declassify informa-
tion or provide suspects or counsel with adequate substitutes.  See, e.g., Attorney General 
Michael B. Mukasey, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Re-
search (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/
2008/index.html.  For a general discussion of these issues in the criminal context, see SERRIN 
TURNER & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, THE SECRECY PROBLEM 
IN TERRORISM TRIALS (2005).
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available information.77 They also include the application of lethal force, 
both in the heat of battle as well as from afar using, for example, aerial 
drones against suspected al-Qaida figures.78 According to one report, in 
2008 the U.S. government ratcheted up drone attacks on al-Qaida affiliated 
militants in Pakistan in part by lowering the standards that govern targeting: 
“We got down to a sort of ‘reasonable man’ standard . . . . If it seemed rea-
sonable, you could hit it.”79
Besides raising important questions about the appropriate standards 
of proof, the statements quoted above from district courts reflect an attitude 
that judicial scrutiny of information or evidence is a fundamentally different 
exercise than the type of military decision-making that, beyond Guantána-
mo, currently remains outside the reach of judicial review. If so, this sug-
gests that the application of judicial review to Guantánamo cases has not 
merely added a layer of procedural rigor, but in doing so has altered the 
analytic processes being applied to available information.
One example of this tension between evidence and intelligence 
standards is the case of Al Mutairi v. United States, described above. The 
district court credited the government’s evidence that petitioner’s travel 
route into Afghanistan matched that used by an al-Qaida affiliated group to 
smuggle individuals into Afghanistan to wage jihad; that his travel within 
Afghanistan coincided with that of fleeing al-Qaida fighters; and that some 
facts about his passport were consistent with an individual who has under-
gone al-Qaida training.80 The district court also found that Al Mutairi’s own 
story lacked credibility.81
77 See Department of Defense, Detainee Review Procedures at Bagram Theater Internment 
Facility (BTIF), Afghanistan (U), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2009/09/addendum.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
But the district court was unsatisfied with the 
government’s case because it could not prove that petitioner did, in fact, 
train with al-Qaida or allied groups, or where he did so: “the Government 
78 See Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, The Drone War, NEW REPUBLIC, June 3, 
2009, http://www.tnr.com/article/the-drone-war; Jane Mayer, The Predator War, NEW 
YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 36, 42–45 (detailing use of missile strikes against suspected ter-
rorists amid imperfect intelligence, and resulting errors); Josh Meyer, CIA Expands Use of 
Drones in Terror War, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at A1 (“In February 2002, a Predator 
tracked and killed a tall man in flowing robes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The 
CIA believed it was firing at Bin Laden, but the victim turned out to be someone else.”). On 
legal issues of targeted killings, see Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterter-
rorism Strategy and Law (May 11, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0511_
counterrorism_anderson.aspx.
79 See DAVID E. SANGER, THE INHERITANCE: THE WORLD OBAMA CONFRONTS AND THE 
CHALLENGES TO AMERICAN POWER 250 (2009).
80 Al Mutairi v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2364173, at *14 
(D.D.C. July 29, 2009).
81 Id.
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has not filled in these blanks . . . with sufficiently credible and reliable evi-
dence to meet its burden . . . .”82 It may well be that under these facts the 
government ought not to be able to detain someone, either as a matter of law 
or policy. But it also seems quite likely that a reasonable intelligence officer 
might assess this case very differently, especially operating from a baseline 
expectation that some “blanks” are to be expected in many cases and require 
informed but speculative judgment to fill them.83
To say that the information and analytic processes relied upon by 
the executive in performing its military functions are unsuitable in court 
would go beyond merely rejecting the executive’s assertion in the 2004 Su-
preme Court litigation that military tactical decisions—including whom to 
capture—are beyond the reach and competency of courts. Courts could have 
answered that claim, for example, by insisting on a role for judicial review 
of detention but then inquiring deferentially whether the government’s own 
analytic assessment was reasonable.84
[A military strike targeting suspected terrorists] is the responsibility of the 
executive branch. It has the professional-security expertise to make that 
decision. The Court will ask itself if a reasonable military commander 
could have made the decision which was made. The question is whether 
the decision of the military commander falls within the zone of reasonable 
activity on the part of the commander. If the answer is yes, the Court will
not exchange the military commander’s security discretion with the securi-
ty discretion of the Court.
That is essentially what the Israeli 
Supreme Court did in its 2006 decision upholding but limiting the execu-
tive’s authority for “targeted killings” of terrorist leaders—another contro-
versial security measure that relies critically on intelligence information, 
sometimes amid clouds of uncertainty:
85
82 Id.
83 In this regard, circumstantial evidence is one criminal law context in which there is less 
distinction between evidence and intelligence analysis.
84 See generally Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV.
1361 (2009). See also Fallon and Meltzer, supra note 18, at 2095 (“[A] court exercising 
habeas jurisdiction immediately confronts a ‘scope of review’ question: it could, for exam-
ple, make an independent determination with no deference to the prior executive judgment, 
exercise review but exhibit some deference, or defer completely by withholding review of 
the issue altogether.”).
85 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr., HCJ 769/02, at ¶ 57 (Dec. 14, 
2006), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf 
(citing Aga v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip Area, HCJ 1005/89, 44(1) 
PD 536, 539; Ajuri v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area, HCJ 
7015/02, 56(6) PD 352, 375). See also Amos N. Guiora, License to Kill, FOREIGN POL’Y
(July 13, 2009), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/13/licence_to_kill (stating 
“[t]he basis for the attack is intelligence information that meets a four part test: Is it reliable, 
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One might immediately object that targeted killing is a very differ-
ent application of coercive state power than detention. Of course it is.86 But 
the ways in which it is different and the manner in which those distinctions 
ought to influence the institutional decision-making balance among the 
branches of government are complex questions left open by Boumediene,
and only their surface is being scratched in Guantánamo habeas cases.87
IV. LOOKING FORWARD
At the time of this writing, it remains unclear which branch or 
branches of government will resolve these questions of proof and evidence 
standards for future detention decisions, let alone where to set that 
line.88
First, embedded in the seemingly simple exercises of setting a stan-
dard of proof and sufficiency of evidence standard for judicial review of 
detention decisions are fundamental choices about balancing risks (errone-
However, this brief examination of some of the few district court 
cases that have dealt with the issue yields several insights or questions that 
should guide further legal development as the U.S. government contem-
plates a post-Guantánamo future.
credible, valid and viable? Given the stakes, corroborated information is significantly prefer-
able to information that comes from a single source.”).
86 See Waxman, supra note 5, at 1402–29.
87 To the extent that one looks to other federal habeas or appellate contexts by analogy, 
there are several different frames through which to consider appropriate judicial posture.  
One might, for example, look to  rigorous federal habeas evidentiary hearings in cases where 
the prior state fact-finding or evidentiary hearing is considered inadequate. See Townsend v. 
Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312–18 (1963); HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 17, at § 20.3(d)–(f).  On 
the other hand, one might analogize Guantánamo-type detention habeas cases to federal 
appellate review of probable cause determinations by police, or other such context-sensitive 
discretionary decision-making.  In Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), the Court 
held that:
[A]s a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause 
should be reviewed de novo on appeal.  Having said this, we hasten to point out 
that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact on-
ly for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by 
resident judges and local law enforcement officers.
Id. at 699.  The Court reasoned that “a police officer views the facts through the lens of his 
police experience and expertise.  The background facts provide a context for the historical 
facts, and when seen together yield inferences that deserve deference.” Id.
88 President Obama pledged to work with Congress in fashioning a post-Guantánamo legal 
framework that includes a strong role for courts.  See President Barack Obama, Remarks by 
the President on National Security at the National Archive (May 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-
Security-5-21-09/. Since then, however, the White House has signaled that it will not seek 
legislation to regulate detention of Guantánamo detainees. See Peter Finn, Administration 
Won’t Seek New Detention System, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2009, at A10; Anne E. Kornblut & 
Dafna Linzer, White House Regroups on Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2009.
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ous long-term deprivation of liberty versus letting a terrorist go free), distri-
buting those risks between captured individuals and society threatened by 
terrorism, and relying on judicial scrutiny versus deference to military or 
executive decision-making.89
Second, if the hypothesis of Part III is correct—that in assessing the 
sufficiency of the government’s case courts are subtly transforming not just 
the procedures of review but the nature of the factual evaluation—then the 
current gulf between legal regulation of detention at Guantánamo and else-
where is wider than may be supposed. The standards of proof and evidence 
relied on by the executive outside of Guantánamo to detain under the same 
wartime legal authorities may be lower than those being applied to Guantá-
namo or may involve very different types of information and analytic 
processes.
The law of war vests considerable discretion 
in military commanders because judgments balancing humanitarian harms 
and military necessity are so context-dependent, often involving tremendous 
potential risks in either direction. Procedural due process doctrine only rare-
ly confronts similarly dire consequences of both false positives and false 
negatives, and even more rarely without statutory guidance or some other 
constitutional or common law principles about how to balance those risks. 
90 Such disparities could not only inadvertently skew incentives 
regarding where the executive will hold detainees but would raise consider-
ably the stakes of ongoing litigation about whether habeas rights extend to 
detainees held in Afghanistan.91
Given the significant and long-term public policy import of the un-
derlying risk calibration questions, Congress ought to play a significant role 
89 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 18, at 2069 (“Modern notions of deference to adminis-
trative decisionmakers, developed primarily in other contexts, are in considerable tension 
with the historic office of the Great Writ.”).
90 On the application of the law of war to U.S. detention operations in Afghanistan, see 
Matthew C. Waxman, United States Detention Operations in Afghanistan and the Law of 
Armed Conflict, 39 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 161 (2009).
91 To date, there has been limited litigation dealing with this issue; only one court has 
squarely addressed the question of habeas rights for Bagram detainees.  See Maqaleh v. 
Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009). In that case, Judge Bates held that three out of 
four detainees before him were entitled to habeas protection; the fourth could not invoke the 
Suspension Clause due to his Afghan citizenship. Id. at 209. There was, however, no discus-
sion as to the standards of proof or evidence being applied in that case, as the court did not 
reach the merits of the habeas petitions.  Rather, the court decided the as applied constitutio-
nality of a statute amending federal habeas jurisdiction, and even this limited holding was 
stayed several months later in the face of a government motion to stay the decision pending 
appeal. See Maqaleh  v. Gates, Civil Action No. 06-1669, slip op. at 1, 9–10 (D.D.C. June 1, 
2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/bagram-
order-6-1-09.pdf. See also Warren Richey, Next Flash Point over Terror Detainees: Bagram 
Prison, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 12, 2009, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
2009/0212/p01s01-usmi.html; Charlie Savage, Embracing Bush Argument, Obama Upholds 
Detainee Policy in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at A6, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/washington/22bagram.html.
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in helping to resolve them.92
(i) [W]hether the status determination of the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal with regard to such alien was consistent with the standards and 
procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals (including the requirement that the conclusion of the 
Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence and allowing a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence); and
Until now, these issues have largely been 
worked out through a back and forth struggle between the executive and the 
courts. In the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, Congress touched on the proof 
standard issue obliquely in mandating that federal court review of Guantá-
namo detentions would be limited to:
93 (ii) 
to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, 
whether the use of such standards and procedures to make the determina-
tion is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.94
But at that time Congress and the executive were trying to restrict
judicial reconsideration of the underlying factual claims, and the rest of the 
statute gave the executive wide latitude to determine appropriate informa-
tional assessment standards and processes.95
92 See Benjamin Wittes & Jack Goldsmith, Will Obama Follow Bush or FDR?, WASH.
POST, June 29, 2009, at A17 (discussing and criticizing both a unilateral executive approach 
and the lengthy legislative approach to dealing with terrorist detainees); David A. Martin, 
Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The Underappreciated Vir-
tues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125 (Winter 2005) (proposing a sys-
tem with limited habeas review in which courts would defer to military factfinding but would 
retain authority to consider validity of tribunal procedures and the substantive standards 
governing “enemy combatant" classifications).
Besides the fact that the Com-
batant Status Review Tribunal process was held to be an inadequate substi-
tute for habeas corpus in Boumediene, several major factors argue in favor 
of thoroughly re-examining previous policy assumptions. Those factors 
include better knowledge about the detainee population at Guantánamo and 
elsewhere, the evolving nature of the transnational terrorism threat, the ca-
pacity of the government to make “accurate” determinations of dangerous-
ness, and the development or enhancement of other government counter-
terrorism tools and legal authorities to combat threats. Congress ought 
therefore consider whether innovative approaches to the standard of proof 
and evidence questions—beyond both the usual habeas approach and the 
usual law of war approach—might best balance competing interests. For 
example, legislation regulating detention might escalate the required stan-
dard of proof in periodic review by a court, beginning with a relatively low 
93 See Waxman, supra note 5, at 1408–12.
94 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2680, 2742.
95 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in the War on Terrorism, 2 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 259, 260–67 (2006); Fallon & Meltzer, supra, note 18, at 2060.
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standard to justify short-term detention but a much more rigorous standard 
beyond a certain duration.96
Analysis of the Guantánamo habeas cases shows that seemingly 
straightforward issues of proof and evidentiary standards depend heavily on 
the appropriate baseline: war versus peacetime, military discretion based on 
intelligence versus law enforcement discretion based on evidence. In 2004, 
when the Supreme Court decided Hamdi, courts generally seemed to favor 
the former. By 2009, there has been a largely unspoken drift by courts to-
ward the latter. Ultimately, effective institutional reform will require view-
ing the problem from a perspective that combines features of courtroom 
justice and battlefield combat, evidentiary scrutiny and intelligence analysis.
96 See Waxman, supra note 5, at 1408–12.
